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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
The romantic notion of having an island to one’s self has 
long captivated people’s imagination. Twelve years ago, the 
parties to this case contemplated the sale and purchase of a 
small island in the U.S. Virgin Islands. The deal fell apart and 
took a decidedly unromantic turn—the parties have been 
litigating the aftermath ever since. We addressed the merits of 
the parties’ claims in a previous opinion, Addie v. Kjaer, 737 
F.3d 854 (3d Cir. 2013). At issue in the present appeals are 
prejudgment and postjudgment interest and attorney’s fees. 
I 
Our previous opinion provided a detailed factual and 
procedural history. Id. at 857–61. There is no need to rehash 
that history in its entirety here, so what follows is a 
condensed version. 
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In 2004, Robert Addie, Jorge Perez, and Jason Taylor 
entered into several contracts to buy a small island off the 
coast of St. Thomas and a launch point on St. Thomas for, 
respectively, $21,000,000 and $2,500,000. The sellers were 
Christian Kjaer and his family members Helle Bundgaard, 
Steen Bundgaard, John Knud Fürst, Kim Fürst, and Nina 
Fürst. The sellers’ attorney was Kevin D’Amour, who was 
also the sole owner of the escrow company involved in the 
transaction. The contracts required the buyers to pay a deposit 
of $1,000,000. The buyers later paid an additional $500,000 
to extend the closing date. Taylor provided the money for 
these deposits, which were nonrefundable. After another 
extension of the closing date, the buyers had not paid the 
purchase price, and the sellers had not conveyed marketable 
title. D’Amour sent the buyers a notice of default, and the 
buyers in turn demanded that the deposits be refunded. 
Shortly thereafter, the buyers sued the sellers and D’Amour in 
the District Court of the Virgin Islands, asserting various tort 
and contract claims. The sellers filed counterclaims. 
The district court granted summary judgment to the 
buyers on a conversion claim against D’Amour for 
$500,000.1 The remaining claims were tried to a jury, which 
awarded Taylor (alone) $1,546,000 (remitted to $1,500,000) 
in contract damages from the sellers and $46,000 for 
fraudulent misrepresentation by D’Amour. The jury awarded 
the sellers $339,516.76 in damages from Addie and Perez for 
misrepresenting their ability to purchase the properties, but 
                                              
1.  The district court also dismissed the buyers’ claims 
against the sellers for negligent misrepresentation, 
fraud, and conversion. 
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the district court granted Addie and Perez judgment as a 
matter of law because it concluded that the tort claims were 
barred by the gist of the action doctrine. On motion by the 
sellers, the district court reduced Taylor’s contract damages 
award to $0, concluding that no damages were appropriate 
since all parties had breached the contracts. The district court 
upheld the fraudulent misrepresentation verdict against 
D’Amour for $46,000. 
On appeal, we concluded that the gist of the action 
doctrine applied and barred all tort claims. Id. at 865. We 
affirmed the order granting judgment as a matter of law to 
Addie and Perez and reversed both the order granting 
summary judgment against D’Amour and the jury verdict 
against D’Amour. We concluded that the buyers and the 
sellers failed to perform under the contracts and affirmed the 
order of the district court denying all damages for breach of 
contract. Id. at 864. But we also concluded that Taylor was 
entitled to restitution from the sellers in the amount of 
$1,500,000. Id. at 864–65.  
On remand, the district court entered judgment for 
Taylor for $1,500,000 on April 3, 2014. The district court 
entertained motions from Taylor (for prejudgment interest, 
costs, and attorney’s fees) and D’Amour (for costs and 
attorney’s fees).  
The district court found that awarding prejudgment 
interest at the statutory rate of 9 percent “would amount to a 
windfall,” and instead awarded prejudgment interest at a rate 
of 3 percent for the time during which the sellers possessed 
the funds—September 22, 2004, to April 26, 2010, and 
November 7, 2011, to April 3, 2014. (App. 219.) From April 
26, 2010, to November 7, 2011, the funds were deposited in 
the registry of the district court, and the court awarded the 
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interest actually earned during that period. The district court 
concluded that postjudgment interest should run from April 3, 
2014, the date of its judgment after remand, and not August 
14, 2009, the date of its original judgment.  
The district court declined to award attorney’s fees to 
Taylor, concluding that he “was a prevailing party in a 
meaningful sense on only one claim—unjust enrichment.” 
(App. 217.) Taylor’s “role in breaching the contract” and the 
complexity of the case “counsel[ed] against awarding any 
party attorney’s fees.” (App. 217–18.) The district court 
concluded that D’Amour was not entitled to an award of 
attorney’s fees because of his conduct. The court noted that 
the jury found he made fraudulent misrepresentations and 
fraudulently failed to disclose information he was under a 
duty to disclose. Taylor,2 the sellers, and D’Amour filed 
notices of appeal. 
II3 
We are faced with five issues in these appeals. First, we 
address whether it was appropriate to award prejudgment 
interest on the $1,500,000 in restitution awarded to Taylor, 
and, if so, whether the district court erred by awarding 3 
percent interest. We conclude that prejudgment interest at 9 
percent is mandatory in this case under the Virgin Islands 
                                              
2.  Addie and Perez disclaimed any interest in the 
$1,500,000 awarded to Taylor.  
3.  The district court had jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C. 
§ 1612(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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prejudgment interest statute. Second, we review the district 
court’s decision to award only the actual interest earned while 
the disputed funds were in the court’s registry, and we find no 
error in that decision. Third, we conclude that the district 
court was correct to award postjudgment interest from the 
date of the judgment after remand rather than the date of the 
original judgment following the jury verdict. Fourth and fifth, 
we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion by 
declining to award attorney’s fees to Taylor and D’Amour. 
A 
We start our prejudgment interest analysis with the 
Virgin Islands prejudgment interest statute, which provides, in 
pertinent part: 
(a) The rate of interest shall be nine 
(9%) per centum per annum on—(1) all 
monies which have become due; (2) 
money received to the use of another 
and retained beyond a reasonable time 
without the owner’s consent, either 
express or implied; (3) money due upon 
the settlement of matured accounts 
from the day the balance is ascertained; 
and (4) money due or to become due 
where there is a contract and no rate is 
specified. 
V.I. Code tit. 11, § 951(a). 
The district court found that Taylor was entitled to 
prejudgment interest. But the court was concerned that 
prejudgment interest at 9 percent was “a substantial sum”—
approximately $1,300,000— that was “nearly equivalent to 
the judgment amount.” (App. 219.) The court considered this 
“a windfall.” (Id.) Accordingly, it reduced the interest rate to 
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3 percent for the periods during which the funds were in the 
sellers’ possession.4  
The sellers assert that the district court erred by awarding 
any prejudgment interest. Taylor argues that the district court 
erred by awarding less than the 9 percent interest rate 
specified by V.I. Code tit. 11, § 951(a). The question we must 
answer, then, is whether awarding prejudgment interest under 
V.I. Code tit. 11, § 951(a) is mandatory. We hold that it is 
mandatory in this case for three reasons. 
First, the statute is worded in mandatory terms. It is a 
simple command: the rate of interest “shall be” 9 percent. 
Where the Legislature of the Virgin Islands intended to give 
courts discretion, it did so explicitly. E.g., V.I. Code tit. 5, 
§ 541(b) (“[T]here shall be allowed to the prevailing party in 
the judgment such sums as the court in its discretion may fix 
by way of indemnity for his attorney’s fees . . . .”). The 
prejudgment interest statute affords no such discretion.5 
                                              
4. The district court had awarded prejudgment interest at 9 
percent in the 2009 judgment following the jury verdict.  
5.  We have not previously considered whether courts have 
discretion under V.I. Code tit. 11, § 951(a). We have 
noted, however, that under Virgin Islands law, “the 
district court is given discretion to award prejudgment 
interest on unliquidated sums as justice requires.” Am. 
Home Assurance Co. v. Sunshine Supermarket, Inc., 753 
F.2d 321, 329 (3d Cir. 1985) (emphasis added). This 
pronouncement is consistent with V.I. Code tit. 11, 
§ 951(a), which applies to money that is due—in other 
words, liquidated sums. 
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Second, courts have interpreted similarly worded statutes 
from other states as mandatory. For example, New York law 
provides that  
[i]nterest shall be recovered upon a sum 
awarded because of a breach of 
performance of a contract, or because 
of an act or omission depriving or 
otherwise interfering with title to, or 
possession or enjoyment of, property, 
except that in an action of an equitable 
nature, interest and the rate and date 
from which it shall be computed shall 
be in the court’s discretion.  
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5001(a) (emphasis added). Under this statute, 
prejudgment interest is mandatory in a breach of contract 
action. New England Ins. Co. v. Healthcare Underwriters 
Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 599, 606 (2d Cir. 2003). The interest 
rate is also mandatory under New York law. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 
§ 5004 (“Interest shall be at the rate of nine per centum per 
annum, except where otherwise provided by statute.”); Oy 
Saimaa Lines Logistics Ltd. v. Mozaica-N.Y., Inc., 193 F.R.D. 
87, 90 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Under New York law, the court has 
no discretion to award prejudgment interest at a rate higher 
than the statutory rate.”); cf. Int’l Telemeter Corp. v. Hamlin 
Int’l Corp., 754 F.2d 1492, 1494 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Under New 
York law, the district court had no discretion to deviate from 
the 9% rate in awarding post-judgment interest.”).  
Massachusetts has a similarly phrased statute for 
prejudgment interest in tort actions. Under Massachusetts law,  
[i]n any action in which a verdict is 
rendered or a finding made or an order 
for judgment made for pecuniary 
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damages for personal injuries to the 
plaintiff or for consequential damages, 
or for damage to property, there shall 
be added by the clerk of court to the 
amount of damages interest thereon at 
the rate of twelve per cent per annum 
from the date of commencement of the 
action . . . . 
Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 231, § 6B (emphasis added). This 
prejudgment interest is mandatory. Bennett v. City of Holyoke, 
362 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2004). So is the 12 percent interest 
rate. Doty v. Sewall, 908 F.2d 1053, 1063 (1st Cir. 1990).   
Third, the Virgin Islands decision that the district court 
cited in finding it had discretion over whether to award 
prejudgment interest, Rasmussen v. Dalmida, 50 V.I. 1032 
(D.V.I. 2008), relied on inapposite authority. In Rasmussen, 
the district court stated that “[a] court may exercise its 
discretion to award prejudgment interest ‘upon considerations 
of fairness and prejudgment interest may be denied when its 
exaction would be inequitable.’” Id. at 1039–40 (quoting 
Thabault v. Chait, 541 F.3d 512, 534 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
Thabault was a diversity case in which we applied New 
Jersey law. The New Jersey prejudgment interest statute, 
unlike that of the Virgin Islands (or New York or 
Massachusetts), explicitly permits courts to “suspend the 
running” of prejudgment interest “in exceptional cases.” N.J. 
Court R. 4:42-11(b). The Thabault decision provides no basis 
to conclude that prejudgment interest in the Virgin Islands is 
similarly discretionary. 
Rasmussen also cited Anthuis v. Colt Industries 
Operating Corp., 971 F.2d 999, 1010 (3d Cir. 1992), and 
Knapp v. Ernst & Whinney, 90 F.3d 1431, 1442 (9th Cir. 
11 
 
1996). In Anthuis, an ERISA case, we noted that, “[i]n the 
absence of an explicit congressional directive, the awarding 
of prejudgment interest under federal law is committed to the 
trial court’s broad discretion.” 971 F.2d at 1009 (quoting 
Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers, 726 F.2d 972, 981–82 
(3d Cir. 1984)). In Knapp, a securities law case under section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that it was 
appropriate for the district court to deny prejudgment interest 
when it would amount to “a windfall recovery” for the 
plaintiff. 90 F.3d at 1442. ERISA and Rule 10b-5 do not 
provide for prejudgment interest and thus fall under the 
general, court-made rule committing the question to the 
discretion of the district courts. These decisions, and other 
decisions interpreting federal statutes without a prejudgment 
interest provision, are simply not relevant for interpreting V.I. 
Code tit. 11, § 951(a).6 
We must address one additional argument that the district 
court could exercise its discretion in this case. The sellers 
argue that, because the recovery was for restitution rather than 
breach of contract, the district court had the authority to vary 
                                              
6.  Other decisions of lower courts in the Virgin Islands 
have stated that awarding prejudgment interest is 
discretionary. See, e.g., Deward v. Bushfield, 993 F. 
Supp. 365 (D.V.I. App. Div. 1998) (reviewing the trial 
court’s decision to grant prejudgment interest for abuse 
of discretion); Bookworm, Inc. v. Tirado, No. Civ. 
538/1997, 2002 WL 1765782 (V.I. Terr. Ct. July 1, 
2002). We are not bound by those decisions, and we find 
them similarly mistaken. 
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from the statutory rate by exercising its equitable powers. 
Sellers support this contention by citing Peterson v. Crown 
Financial Corp., 661 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1981). Interpreting 
Pennsylvania law, we found in Peterson that “because [the 
plaintiff’s] claim sounds in restitution, it calls for the exercise 
of the court’s broader equitable powers. … [T]he trial judge 
does have discretion in such cases to award damages in the 
nature of prejudgment interest in an amount greater than [the] 
six percent [provided by statute].” Id. at 292–93.  
The applicable Pennsylvania statute provided that  
Reference in any law or document 
enacted or executed heretofore or 
hereafter to “legal rate of interest” and 
reference in any document to an 
obligation to pay a sum of money “with 
interest” without specification of the 
applicable rate shall be construed to 
refer to the rate of interest of six per 
cent per annum. 
41 Pa. Stat. § 202. By its terms, this statute applies to 
contracts and contractual damages. See Peterson, 661 F.2d at 
292 (“[U]nder Pennsylvania law, prejudgment interest in the 
ordinary suit for contract damages is limited to the six percent 
legal rate.”). In contrast, the Virgin Islands statute is broader 
and applies to “all monies which have become due,” not just 
money due under a contractual theory of recovery. V.I. Code 
tit. 11, § 951(a)(1).7 
                                              
7. New York’s prejudgment interest statute similarly 
provides discretion in equitable actions, and in this 
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For these reasons, we hold that prejudgment interest at 9 
percent is required in this case. The Legislature of the Virgin 
Islands has determined that prejudgment interest is to be 
awarded at the rate of 9 percent, and it is not our place to alter 
the statute or add our gloss to it.8 The district court erred by 
awarding interest at a rate other than the rate provided by 
statute.9  
                                                                                                     
respect it differs from V.I. Code tit. 11, § 951(a). N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. § 5001(a). 
8.  Should the Legislature of the Virgin Islands determine 
that 9 percent is too high or that courts should have 
discretion in making interest awards, it is perfectly 
capable of amending the law, as it has done in other 
contexts. The Virgin Islands postjudgment interest 
statute, V.I. Code tit. 5, § 426, formerly provided for a 9 
percent interest rate but was amended in 2001 to reduce 
the rate to 4 percent. No similar change was made to V.I. 
Code tit. 11, § 951(a). 
9. We do not share the district court’s concern that 
awarding Taylor prejudgment interest at the statutorily 
required rate of 9 percent would amount to a windfall. 
When Taylor handed over his deposit in 2004, interest 
rates were significantly higher than they are today. 
Before they fell to the current rate of around 3.5 percent, 
prime lending rates, for example, were around 5 percent 
in 2004, steadily climbed to around 8 percent by 2006, 
and hovered around 6 to 8 percent until 2008. See 
Selected Interest Rates (Weekly) - H.15, Bd. of 
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B 
We next turn to the interest awarded for the period 
during which the disputed funds were in the registry of the 
district court, April 14, 2010, to November 7, 2011. The 
district court explained that the court “is not a for-profit 
enterprise, nor is it in the business of generating profit for 
                                                                                                     
Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/default.htm 
(last visited Aug. 25, 2016) (Federal Reserve statistical 
sheets for 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2016); Levan v. 
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 190 F.3d 1230, 1235 n.12 
(11th Cir. 1999) (taking judicial notice of the prime 
rate). Putting aside these fluctuations, the interest Taylor 
could have otherwise collected on his $1,500,000 is 
significant when we consider monthly compounding 
over the course of a decade. For example, monthly 
compounding of $1,500,000 at an interest rate of 3.5 
percent over ten years would yield over $600,000 in 
interest, and compounding at a rate of 6 percent would 
result in interest of $1,200,000. Using another proxy, if 
Taylor invested his $1,500,000 in a S&P 500 stock 
market index fund over this time period, he could have 
expected to roughly double his investment, assuming 
dividend reinvestment. See Chris Kahn, Historical 
returns investing calculator, Bankrate.com, 
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/investing/historical-
returns-investing-calculator.aspx (last visited Aug. 25, 
2016). In our view, these considerations counterbalance 
what might otherwise seem like a windfall for Taylor.     
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parties.” (App. 220.) For that reason, the court ordered that 
Taylor receive the actual interest earned while the money was 
in the registry of the court. This was $19,650.45. Taylor 
argues that the district court should have awarded him 9 
percent prejudgment interest even for the period during which 
the funds were in the registry of the court, a substantially 
larger sum.  
Under our precedent, however, the district court was 
correct. In Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Sharp, 87 
F.3d 89 (3d Cir. 1996), we interpreted V.I. Code tit. 11, 
§ 951(a) to permit prejudgment interest from the date a notice 
of claim was filed until the date the defendant deposited the 
funds into the district court’s registry. Id. at 93 (citing Atlin v. 
Security-Conn. Life Ins. Co., 788 F.2d 139, 142 (3d Cir. 
1986), for the proposition that “no interest runs against the 
stakeholder after he pays the disputed sum into court”). In 
Atlin, we noted two factors supporting the conclusion that 
paying the funds into the court relieves the paying party from 
prejudgment interest: “First, the stakeholder no longer has 
access to the money and enjoys no further benefit. Second, 
while deposited in the registry, the money presumably will be 
invested and accrue interest for the benefit of the ultimate 
recipient.” Atlin, 788 F.2d at 142.  
Given this clear authority, the district court did not err by 
awarding Taylor only the actual interest earned while the 
funds were in the registry of the court. We will affirm the 
judgment of the district court in this respect. 
C 
The sellers assert that the district court erroneously 
determined the date prejudgment interest ends and 
postjudgment interest begins. The sellers argue that 
postjudgment interest should accrue from August 14, 2009, 
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when the district court entered its original judgment following 
the jury verdict. Taylor argues that the district court correctly 
awarded postjudgment interest from April 3, 2014, the date of 
the district court’s judgment after remand.10  
Our review of the district court’s determination of the 
accrual date for postjudgment interest is plenary. Loughman v. 
Consol-Pa. Coal Co., 6 F.3d 88, 97 (3d Cir. 1993). There are 
no relevant decisions interpreting the Virgin Islands 
postjudgment interest statute, V.I. Code tit. 5, § 426. Our 
analysis is guided by the federal postjudgment interest statute, 
28 U.S.C. § 1961, which we have noted is “analogous” to V.I. 
Code tit. 5, § 426. Christian v. Joseph, 15 F.3d 296, 298 (3d 
Cir. 1994).  
Whether postjudgment interest should run from the date 
of the original judgment following the jury verdict or the 
post-remand judgment “turns on the degree to which the 
original judgment was upheld or invalidated on appeal.” 
Loughman, 6 F.3d at 97 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1961). The 
application of this standard is fact specific. For example, “if 
the original judgment is affirmed in whole, such as where the 
court of appeals reverses the district court’s grant of judgment 
n.o.v. and orders the original judgment reinstated in its 
entirety, post-judgment interest will accrue from the date of 
the first judgment.” Id. at 98. To the contrary, if the original 
judgment is reversed, postjudgment interest accrues from the 
                                              
10.  This dispute is animated by the difference between the 
statutory prejudgment interest rate (9 percent) and the 
statutory postjudgment interest rate (4 percent). 
Compare V.I. Code tit. 11, § 951(a), with V.I. Code tit. 5, 
§ 426.  
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date of the judgment after remand. “[D]istilled to its essence,” 
the inquiry is when “liability and damages, as finally 
determined, were ascertained or established.” Id. 
In this case, the jury determined that the sellers were 
liable to Taylor for $1,546,000 in damages for breach of 
contract, which the district court remitted to $1,500,000 in its 
judgment dated August 14, 2009. The sellers moved for 
judgment as a matter of law or amended judgment. The 
district court found that Taylor failed to tender performance 
and was barred from recovering on his breach of contract 
claim. In an order dated March 1, 2011, the court amended 
the judgment from $1,500,000 to $0. In the first appeal, we 
agreed that neither Taylor nor the sellers could recover for 
breach of contract but found that Taylor was entitled to 
restitution of the $1,500,000 deposit. Addie, 737 F.3d at 865. 
On April 3, 2014, the district court ordered that the sellers 
return Taylor’s $1,500,000 deposit and entered judgment in 
that amount.  
The sellers argue that damages were ascertained at the 
time of the August 2009 judgment because “[t]he amount of 
the award is the amount of Taylor’s deposit, which has always 
been known in this litigation.” (Seller’s Br. 40.) The sellers 
assert that the fact that the legal theory underlying the damage 
award changed from breach of contract to restitution is 
irrelevant. This argument is unavailing.  
When the legal basis for the judgment changes after 
appeal, postjudgment interest properly begins from the time 
of the judgment after remand. See Loughman, 6 F.3d at 97–98 
(“In general, where a first judgment lacks an evidentiary or 
legal basis, post-judgment interest accrues from the date of 
the second judgment; where the original judgment is basically 
sound but is modified on remand, post-judgment interest 
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accrues from the date of the first judgment.” (quoting Cordero 
v. De Jesus-Mendez, 922 F.2d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 1990)); Lewis v. 
Whelan, 99 F.3d 542, 545 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[W]here the first 
judgment is vacated because it lacks a legal basis or requires 
further factual development, the vacated award should be 
treated as a nullity and post-judgment interest therefore 
accrues from the entry of judgment on remand.”).  
As we set forth in the first Addie decision, we affirmed 
the amended judgment of $0 on the contractual claims 
because there was no legal basis for the breach of contract 
damages awarded to Taylor in the August 2009 judgment. 
Addie, 737 F.3d at 864. Although the amount of Taylor’s 
recovery ultimately was the same in the 2009 and 2014 
judgments, the nature and legal basis for the judgments 
changed. In accordance with our instructions, on remand in 
2014, the district court granted Taylor recovery on his unjust 
enrichment claim. Back in 2009, the jury found for Taylor on 
this claim during the liability phase of the trial, but the district 
court withdrew it from the jury during the damages phase, 
eventually holding that an unjust enrichment award is 
inappropriate where there are valid contracts. Addie, 737 F.3d 
at 860. Because the district court withdrew it from the jury, 
there was no judgment on the unjust enrichment claim. Thus, 
this is not one of those cases in which a court of appeals 
reversed a judgment of damages n.o.v. and reinstated a jury 
verdict. The final determination of liability and damages was 
not ascertained or established until the judgment of April 3, 
2014, and the district court correctly determined that this was 
the date from which postjudgment interest accrues. 
Loughman, 6 F.3d at 98. We will therefore affirm the district 
court’s judgment on this issue. 
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D 
The Virgin Islands Code authorizes courts to award 
attorney’s fees to the “prevailing party in the judgement.” V.I. 
Code tit. 5, § 541(b). Whether to award attorney’s fees and 
the amount of any award is within the discretion of the district 
court and will only be reversed for a clear abuse of discretion. 
Id.; Lucerne Inv. Co. v. Estate Belvedere, Inc., 411 F.2d 1205, 
1207 (3d Cir. 1969). The determination of whether a party is a 
“prevailing party” under the statute is a legal question subject 
to plenary review. See Truesdell v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 290 
F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2002) (interpreting “prevailing party” 
in the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1988). Taylor argues that the 
district court erroneously determined that he was not a 
prevailing party and asks us to reverse and remand so that the 
district court can properly exercise its discretion in the first 
instance.  
Taylor’s interpretation of the district court’s opinion is 
flawed. The district court did not determine that Taylor was 
not a prevailing party; instead, it exercised its discretion to 
award no fees despite Taylor’s being a prevailing party. Cf. 
Raab v. City of Ocean City, — F.3d ––, — (3d Cir. 2016) 
(noting that in the context of § 1988, prevailing party status is 
necessary but not sufficient to justify a fee award). The 
district court noted that “Taylor was a prevailing party in a 
meaningful sense on only one claim—unjust enrichment.” 
(App. 217.) The district court explained that “Taylor, and his 
co-plaintiffs, failed on the vast majority of claims that they 
brought during the course of this litigation.” (Id.) The district 
court considered “[t]he complexity of [the] matter, … the 
inextricably intertwined breaches occasioned by each party to 
the transaction,” and “the balance between prevailing claims 
and failed claims.” (App. 217–18.) Weighing these 
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considerations, the district court exercised its discretion and 
declined to award Taylor attorney’s fees. 
Alternatively, Taylor argues that the district court failed 
to make sufficient factual findings to support a discretionary 
denial of attorney’s fees to Taylor. Taylor argues that the 
district court’s reliance on the balance between prevailing 
claims and failed claims is erroneous due to a flawed 
prevailing party analysis and that Taylor’s role in breaching 
his obligations under the contract was irrelevant.  
The district court did not engage in a flawed prevailing 
party analysis. And Taylor cites no cases for the proposition 
that considering a party’s conduct is entirely irrelevant for 
determining whether to award attorney’s fees. In similar 
contexts, courts have approved considering a party’s conduct 
when deciding whether to award attorney’s fees. For example, 
in the context of whether to award fees under ERISA, which 
also permits a discretionary award of attorney’s fees, 29 
U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1), we have instructed district courts to 
consider five factors, including “the offending parties’ 
culpability or bad faith” and “the relative merits of the parties’ 
position.” Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 673 (3d 
Cir. 1983). These two factors are fairly analogous to 
considering the balance of the claims won and lost between 
the parties and the parties’ underlying conduct.  
Declining to award attorney’s fees to Taylor was not an 
abuse of discretion. 
E 
D’Amour also appeals the district court’s denial of his 
motion for attorney’s fees. In ruling on D’Amour’s motion, 
the district court considered D’Amour’s conduct. In ruling on 
the parties’ summary judgment motions, the district court 
found that D’Amour was liable to the buyers for conversion 
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as a matter of law, and the jury found that D’Amour 
committed fraud. In the first appeal, we held that the gist of 
the action doctrine barred the conversion and fraud claims. 
Nevertheless, on remand the district court found that 
D’Amour’s underlying conduct weighed against awarding 
attorney’s fees even though he was a prevailing party.  
D’Amour argues that the district court abused its 
discretion by relying on facts found by the jury during the 
jury’s consideration of legally barred claims. According to 
D’Amour, our ruling in the first appeal that the gist of the 
action doctrine barred the tort claims “plainly warrants the 
conclusion that any prior findings of the lower court with 
respect to the improper tort claims were erroneous, and such 
findings are therefore legally irrelevant.” (D’Amour’s Br. 13.) 
D’Amour cites no decisions supporting this position. 
 When we vacated the judgments against D’Amour—
because the tort claims were inextricably intertwined with 
breach of contract claims—the conduct that led the court and 
the jury to find wrongdoing by D’Amour did not disappear. 
D’Amour’s argument that his conduct cannot be considered 
because he could not be liable in tort is not persuasive. The 
district court did not abuse its discretion by considering 
D’Amour’s conduct. We will affirm the denial of D’Amour’s 
motion for attorney’s fees. 
III 
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district 
court’s judgment in all respects except where it awarded 
prejudgment interest at a rate other than the statutorily 
provided 9 percent. On the issue of the prejudgment interest 
rate we reverse and remand.   
